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THE SEVERABILITY OF LEGISLATIVE 
VETO PROVISIONS: AN EXAMINATION 
OF THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND 
IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT OF 1974 
The Congressional Budget and lmpoundment Control Act of 19741 
(the Act) represents a significant legislative effort to maintain congres-
sional control over the federal budget. 2 The Act unites two originally 
separate legislative initiatives: 3 budget process reform (Titles I-IX) 4 and 
impoundment control reform (Thie X). 5 Section 1013(b)6 of Title X 7 
I. Pub. L. No. 93-344; 88 Stat. 297 (1974) (principally codified in 2 U.S.C. §§ 190d, 601-604, 
621-623, 631-642, 651- 653, 661, 681-688 (1982). 
2. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT OF I974-CONFERENCE 
REPORT, S. REP. No.924, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 49, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS 3462, 3591 [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT]. See generally Levine, The Congres-
sional Role in Formulating National Policy: Some Observations on the First Session of the Ninety-
third Congress, 11 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 161, 161-63 (1974); Fisher, Congressional Budget Reform: 
The First Two Years, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 413 (1977). 
3. H.R. REP. No. 658, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1973) (brief summary of the Act's legislative 
history in the House of Representatives) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 7130-REPORT]; Conferees 
Approve Budget Procedures Reform, 32 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1590 (1974). Budget process 
reform sprang from the "battle of the budget" between President Nixon and a Democratic Con-
gress. Congress initiated budget reform by creating the Joint Study Committee on Budget Con-
trol to investigate alternative reforms. Schick, Budget Reform Legislation: Reorganizing Con-
gressional Centers of Fiscal Power, II HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 303, 309-26 (1974). The movement 
for impoundment control reform grew from President Nixon's assertion that the "constitutional 
right for the President of the United States to impound funds ... is absolutely clear," 9 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. Doc. 110 (1973), and from the unprecedented number of impoundments. S. REP. 
No. 93-121, 93d Cong., !st Sess. 9-10 (1973) [hereinafter cited as S. 373-REPORT). See generally 
J. PFIFFNER, THE PRESIDENT, THE BUDGET, AND CONGRESS: IMPOUNDMENT AND THE 1974 BUDGET 
ACT 4 (1979) (concluding that "[t]he greatest impetus for the 1974 budget reform was President 
Nixon's impoundment of funds"). 
4. 2 U .S.C. §§ 190d, 601-603, 621-623, 631-642, 651-653, 661 (1982) (principal provisions). 
Section I (a) of the Act entitles Titles I-IX the "Congressional Budget Act of 1974." Pub. L. 
No. 93-344 § l(a). Titles I-IX are not a perfectly unified package. Nonetheless, because they 
predominately and sufficiently pertain to budget process reform, this Note will refer to Titles 
I-IX as a unified stautory package. 
5. 2 U.S.C. §§ 681-688 (1982). Section l(a) of the Act entitles Title X the "Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974." Pub. L. No. 93-344 § l(a). 
6. Section 1013(b) provides that: "Any amount of budget authority proposed to be deferred 
... shall be made available for obligation if either House of Congress passes an impoundment 
resolution disapproving such proposed deferral." 2 U.S.C._684(b) (1982) (emphasis added). 
7. In addition to section 1013(b)'s deferral mechanism, Section 1012 of Title X prohibits any 
impoundment of budget authority beyond the fiscal year of the impoundment without approval 
by traditional legislation. Section 1012(a) of Title X allows the President to propose a rescission 
of budget authority whenever he -
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allows one House of Congress to veto 8 any executive def er-
determines that all or part of any budget authority will not be required to carry out 
the full objectives or scope of programs for which it is provided or that such budget 
authority should be rescinded for fiscal policy or other reasons (including the termina-
tion of authorized projects or activities for which budget authority has been provided), 
or whenever all or part of budget authority provided for only one fiscal year is to 
be reserved from obligation for such fiscal year .... 
2 U.S.C. § 683(a) (1982). Title X also amended the Antideficiency Act-section 1002. Section 
1002 is codified at 2 U.S.C. § 665(c)(2) (1982). 
The Antideficiency Act of 1950 authorized the Executive to impound appropriated funds for 
contingencies, savings, and other developments. The Antideficiency Act served as the Nixon Ad-
ministration's chief justification for an expanded executive impoundment authority. The Nixon 
Administration frequently justified its many impoundments as prudent fiscal policy exercised 
on authority derived from the clause "other developments." In § 1002 of Title X, Con-
gress removed the clause "other developments" from the Antideficiency Act. See generally Fisher, 
supra note 2, at 445-46 (discussion of the Nixon Administration's use of the term "other 
developments"); COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, VIEWS OF IMPOUNDMENT CON-
TROL AcT, 1974, S. Doc. No. 18, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7 (1975) (communication to Congress 
regarding the Comptroller General's interpretation and application of Title X) [hereinafter cited 
as COMPTROLLER GENERAL). 
A dispute exists whether Title X grants the Executive additional congressional authority to 
impound beyond authority granted in the Antideficiency Act or specific appropriations acts, 
or solely establishes a process for congressional control over impoundments. See generally Id. 
at 14 (concluding that Title X provides some separate authorization for executive deferrals). The 
resolution of whether Congress actually delegated further impoundment authority through Title 
X should not influence the decision concerning section 1013(b)'s severability from Title X. See 
infra note 118. 
8. Title X's legislative veto, section 1013(b), allows one House of Congress to defeat an ex-
ecutive deferral of budget authority by passing "an impoundment resolution disapproving such 
proposed deferral." 2 U.S.C. § 684(b) (1982). The Executive must deliver "a special message 
specifying": 
(I) the amount of budget authority that he proposes to have rescinded or to defer; 
(2) any account, department, or establishment of the Government to which such 
budget authority is available for obligation, and the specific projects or governmental 
functions involved; 
(3) the reasons why the budget authority should be rescinded or is to be deferred; 
(4) to the maximum extent practicable, the estimated fiscal, economic, and budgetary 
effect of the proposed rescission or deferral; and 
(5) all facts, circumstances, and considerations relating to or bearing upon the 
proposed rescission or deferral and the decision to effect the proposed rescission or 
the reservation, and to the maximum extent practicable, the estimated effect of the 
proposed rescission or deferral upon the objects, purposes, and programs for which 
the budget authority is provided. 
2 U.S.C. § 684(a). The Executive delivers the message to the House of Representatives, the Senate, 
and the Comptroller General. Exec. Order No. 11,845, 3 C.F.R. 970 (1971-1975 Compilation), 
authorizes the Office of Management and Budget to transmit deferral and rescission messages 
to Congress. 
Regarding all deferrals of budget authority, the Comptroller General shall inform Congress 
of "(A) the facts surrounding each proposed deferral of budget authority (including the pro-
bable effects thereof) and (B) whether or not (or to what extent), in his judgment, such proposed 
deferral is in accordance with existing statutory authority." 2 U.S.C. § 685(b)(2). The Comp-
troller General also reports the Executive's incorrect classifications of and failures to transmit 
impoundment messages. 2 U.S.C. § 686. Finally, the Comptroller General may bring a civil suit 
to require the Executive to exercise budget authority improperly deferred or rescinded. 2 U.S.C. 
§ 687. See generally Fisher, supra note 2, at 444. For a general discussion of legislative veto 
provisions, see Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 
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ral9 of budget authority. 10 In INS v. Chadha, 11 the Supreme Court 
held that a similar one-house legislative veto provision was an unconstitu-
tional departure from the bicameral and nresentment procedures re-
quired by article I. 12 
Approximately 120 federal statutes contain legislative veto provisions. 
Chadha apparently invalidates nearly all legislative vetos. 13 Consequent-
ly, federal courts frequently will have to determine whether statutes 
remain valid after the excision of their legislative veto provisions. The 
potential, therefore, exists for numerous differences among courts 
regarding the severability of legislative vetos from these 120 statutes. 14 
A uniform framework for determining when a veto provision properly 
may be severed from an otherwise valid statute may lessen the number 
63 CALIF. L. REV. 983, 984-1029 (1975) (a general description of legislative vetos, related devices, 
and both their evolutions). 
9. 2 U.S.C. § 684(b) (1982). Title X section IOI 1(1) defines an Executive deferral to include: 
(A) withholding or delaying the obligation or expenditure of budget authority 
(whether by establishing reserves or otherwise) provided for projects or activities; or 
(B) any other type of Executive action or inaction which effectively precludes the 
obligation or expenditure of budget authority, including authority to obligate by con-
tract in advance of appropriations as specifically authorized by law; ... 
A deferral of budget authority, in effect, is any· impoundment that is not a rescission. Section 
1013(c) limits the application of section 1013 to those impoundments not classified as rescissions 
by section 1012(a). See generally 120 CoNG. REC. 20473 (colloquy between Sen. Ervin and Sen. 
McClellan); A. SCHICK, THE IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT OF 1974: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 49 (Feb. 27, 1976) (Congressional Research Service Multilith 76-455). For a 
discussion of the problems regarding the definition of impoundments generally, see Note, Presiden-
tial Jmpoundment: Constitutional Theories and Political Realities, 61 GEo. L.J. 1295 (1973). 
JO. Section 3(a)(2) of the Act defines budget authority in the following manner: "The term 
'budget authority' means authority provided by law to enter into obligations which will result 
in immediate or future outlays involving Government funds, except that such term does not 
include authority to insure or guarantee the repayment of indebtedness incurred by another per-
son or government." 2 U.S.C. § 622(2) (1982). 
II. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 17-27. The bicameral and presentment clauses of arti-
cle I specify that: 
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be·vested in a Congress of the United 
States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. Art. I, § I. 
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, 
shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; 
... Art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
Every Order, Resolution, or vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and 
House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) 
shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall 
take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed 
by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules 
and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill. Art. I, § 7, cl. 3. 
quoted in INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2781 (1983). (emphasis added by the Court). 
13. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. See generally Watson, supra note 8 (descrip-
tion and analysis of various types of legislative vetos). 
14. The potential splits have become reality. Compare, e.g., EEOC v. Hernando Bank, Inc., 
724 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding severable the one-House legislative veto provision of the 
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of conflicting judicial opinions. 15 
This Note examines the constitutionality of the legislative veto pro-
vision (section 1013(b)) in the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act, and discusses section 1013(b)'s and Title X's·severability 
from the Act. Part I demonstrates that Chadha invalidates section 
1013(b). Part II outlines the traditional severability doctrine. 16 Part III 
proposes a refined model of the severability doctrine with which to 
resolve severability conflicts involving legislative veto provisions. Part 
IV applies the proposed severability model to the Congressional Budget 
and Impoundment Control Act, and concludes that section 1O13(b)'s 
unconstitutionality requires that the entire Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act fall. 
I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 1013(b) 
A. The Chadha Decision 
The Supreme Court in Chadha held the one-House legislative veto 
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, section 244(c)(2), 
unconstitutional. 11 Section 244(c)(2) allowed either chamber of Con-
gress to defeat the Attorney General's decision to suspend deportation 
proceedings against deportable aliens. 18 In Chadha, the Court reasoned 
Reorganization Act of 1977) and EEOC v. Ingersoll Johnson Steel Co., 583 F. Supp. 983 (S.D. 
Ind. 1984) (same) with EEOC v. Martin Indus., Inc., 581 F. Supp. 1029 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (holding 
the provision inserverable, and consequently invalidating Reorganization Plan No. I of 1978, 
which authorized the EEOC to enforce the Equal Pay Act and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act); EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1839 (E.D. Mich. 
1984) (same) and EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1232 
(W.D. Pa. 1984) (same). See also In re Department of Energy Stripper Well Litig., 578 F. Supp. 
586,600 (D. Kan. 1983); Allen v. Carmen, 578 F. Supp. 951, 968-71 (D.D.C. 1983). No com-
prehensive congressional response to Chada appears imminent. See generally Rosenberg, Con-
gressional Life after Chadha: Searching for an Institutional Response, CRS REVIEW, Fall 1983, 
at 5; Sylvester, After Chadha, A Legal Void, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 23, 1984, at I. 
15. The debate over the constitutionality of numerous congressional statutes in the I 930s 
occasioned Robert Stern's classic article on severability and the severability doctrine. See generally 
Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARV. L. REv. 76 (1937). 
16. See infra text accompanying notes 52-62. 
17. INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2787 (1983). 
18. Section 244(c)(2) reads: 
In the case of an alien specified in paragraph (I) of subsection (a) of this section 
- if during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported, or prior to the 
close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a case is reported, 
either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes a resolution stating in substance 
that it does not favor the suspension of such deportation, the Attorney General shall 
thereupon deport such alien .... If, within the time above specified, neither the 
Senate nor the House of Representatives shall pass such a resolution, the Attorney 
General shall cancel deportation proceedings. 
8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982) (emphasis added). 
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that section 244(c)(2) constituted legislative action that must conform 
with article I's bicameral and presentment clauses, because it "was not 
within any of the express constitutional exceptions authorizing one 
House to act alone." 19 Consequently, the Court held section 244(c)(2) 
invalid. 20 
In characterizing the congressional veto provision in Chadha as 
legislative action subject to article I's bicameral and presentment re-
quirements, the Court examined three factors: (1) the purpose and effect 
of the legislative veto provision; (2) the nature of the decision im-
plemented by the one-House veto; and (3) the character of the con-
gressional action that the legislative veto provision supplanted. 21 In 
Chadha, the Court concluded that section 244(c)(2) was legislative ac-
tion in purpose and effect because the provision "had the purpose and 
effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons .. 
. outside the legislative branch." 22 The Court in Chadha also found 
the nature of the House of Representatives' decision to rescind the 
Attorney General's suspension of Chadha's deportation similar to the 
nature of traditional legislation. 23 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the 
majority, 24 equated the nature of Congress's choice to delegate authority 
to the executive branch to allow deportable aliens to remain in the 
United States with the nature of the decision by one House of Con-
gress to rescind the executive action. 25 Both decisions, the Court rea-
19. In Chadha, Chief Justice Burger cited four constitutional exceptions to article I's present-
ment and bicameral requirements under which one House of Congress may act with the 
"unreviewable force of law": 
(a) The House of Representatives alone was given the power to initiate impeach-
ments. Art. I, § 2, cl. 6; 
(b) The Senate alone was given the power to conduct trials following impeach-
ment on charges initiated by the House and to convict following trial. Art. I, § 3, cl. 5; 
(c) The Senate alone was given final unreviewable power to approve or to disap-
prove presidential appointments. Art II, § 2, cl. 2; 
(d) The Senate alone was given unreviewable power to ratify treaties negotiated 
by the President. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2786 (1983). 
20. Id. at 2787. 
21. Id. at 2784-86. 
22. Id. at 2784. 
23. Id. at 2786. 
24. In Chadha, Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion in which he also found section 
244(c)(2)'s one-House legislative veto unconstitutional but on the narrower basis that Congress 
had "assumed a judicial function in violation of the principle of separation of powers." Id. 
at 2789. Justice White filed a dissent in which he argued against ruling legislative vetos unconstitu-
tional under article I's presentment and bicameral clauses or, in this particular instance, separa-
tion of powers principles. Justice White reasoned that not "all legislative vetoes are necessarily 
consistent with separation of powers principles." Id. at 2810. Yet legislative vetos may be "a 
necessary check on the unavoidably expanding power of the agencies, both executive and in-
dependent, as they engage in exercising authority delegated by Congress." Id. Justice Rehnquist 
wrote a dissenting opinion limited to section 244(c)(2)'s severability from the Immigration and 
Nationality Act. Id. at 2816-17. 
25. Id. at 2786. 
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soned, involve policy determinations that are effective only upon com-
pliance with article I's legislative enactment procedures. 26 Finally, the 
Court in Chadha determined that the congressional action that section 
244(c)(2) replaced had a legislative character. 21 Prior to the adoption 
of section 244(c)(2), Congress was forced to enact legislation to defeat 
the executive branch's suspension of deportation proceedings. 
B. The Application of Chadha to Section JOJJ(b) 
The Court's reasoning in Chadha and in its subsequent decisions 
appears to invalidate all legislative vetos 28 not subject to the single enact-
ment procedure of article I. 29 Section 1013(b) authorizes either House 
of Congress to defeat the President's deferral3° of budget authority3 ' 
by a simple resolution of disapproval. 32 Section l 013(b ), therefore, 
presents the paradigm of a one-House legislative veto. 33 Although 
section 1013(b) challenges the underlying philosophy of the Constitu-
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 2785. 
28. E.g., INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2788 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 2792 (White, 
J., dissenting); 129 Cong. Rec. H4797 (daily ed. June 29, 1983) (remarks of Reps. Levitas and 
Broyhill); 129 CoNG. REC. S9742-45 (daily ed. July 12, 1983) (articles from New York Times 
June 23-24, 1983, with comments of legislative veto authorities); Note, INS v. Chadha: The 
Death Knell for the legislative Veto?, 69 IowA L. REV. 513 (1984). 
The Courts broad language in Chadha supports the contention that Chadha invalidated all 
legislative vetos. The Court emphasized absolute adherence to article I: 
The bicameral requirement, the Presentment Clauses, the President's veto, and Con-
gress' power to override a veto were intended to erect enduring checks on each Branch 
and to protect the people from the improvident exercise of power by mandating cer-
tain prescribed steps. To preserve those checks, and maintain the separation of powers, 
the carefully defined limits on the power of each Branch must not be eroded. 
Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2787. Following Chadha the Court summarily affirmed the D.C. Circuit's 
invalidation of the one-House legislative veto in the Natural Gas Policy Act, Process Gas Con-
sumers Group v. Consumers Energy Council of Am., 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983), aff'g mem. sub 
nom. Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425 
(D.C. Cir. 1982), and the concurrent resolution legislative veto in the Federal Trade Commission 
Improvements Act, id. at 3556, aff'g mem. sub nom. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. FTC, 
691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam). Both provisions served as a check upon independent 
regulatory agencies. Justice White dissented in the preceding summary affirmations. He argued 
that "[w]here the veto is placed as a check upon the actions of the independent regulatory agen-
cies, the article I analysis relied upon in Chadha has a particularly hollow ring." Id. at 3558. 
ring." Id. at 3558. 
29. The presentment clauses, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, els. 2, 3, and bicameral clauses, U.S. 
CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7, cl. 2, are the "[e]xplicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution 
[that] prescribe and define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive in the 
legislative process." INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2781 (1983). 
30. See supra note 9. 
31. See supra note IO. 
32. Section 1011(4) of Title X provides that" 'impoundment rese>lution' means a resolution 
of the House of Representatives or the Senate which only expresses its disapproval of a proposed 
deferral of budget authority set forth in a special message transmitted by the President under 
section [1013)." 2 U.S.C. § 682(4) (1982). 
33. See, e.g., Tate, High Court Decision Reopens Dispute Over Impoundments; Congress 
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tion's presentment and bicameral clauses less than section 244(c)(2), 34 
consistent application of the Court's analysis in Chadha requires the 
invalidation of section 1013(b). 35 
I. The Purpose and Effect of Section 1013(b) Action- Congressional 
action under section 1013(b) alters the legal rights and duties of per-
sons outside the legislative branch, and, consequently, exhibits the pur-
pose and effect of traditional legislation. Section 1013(b) allows one 
House of Congress to require the Executive to exercise budget authority36 
by spending funds that otherwise would have been impounded for the 
current fiscal year. 37 Although Congress neither conceded nor denied 
Loses Spending Tool, 41 CONG. Q. 1331 (July 2, 1983); Watson, supra note 8, at 984-87, 987 
n.8 (hypothetical statute illustrating various standard forms of the legislative veto). 
Section 1013(b) is the only legislative veto provision of the Congressional Budget and Im-
poundment Control Act of 1974. Section J0J2(b) of Title X requires affirmative congressional 
legislation, a "rescission bill," before executive rescission of budget authority. Congressional 
action regarding presidential rescission proposals falls within article J's bicameral enactment and 
presentment clauses. Section 1012(b), therefore, is not a legislative veto provision. 
34. The protection of constitutionalism underlies the Court's ruling in Chadha. Chief Justice 
Burger asserted: 
The choices we discern as having been made in the Constitutional Convention im-
pose burdens on governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even un-
workable, but those hard choices were consciously made by men who had lived under 
a form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go unchecked 
.... With all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, we 
have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise 
of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution. 
INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2788 (1983). One essential element of constitutionalism is "fixed 
principles of reason." FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION BETWEEN FRIENDS 2 (1978). Without definite 
standards to limit state officials' exercise of power, constitutionalism weakens, and arbitrary 
and capricious rule abounds. In Chadha, the congressional exercise of a legislative veto to order 
Chadha's deportation appears especially arbitrary and capricious given the absence of an in-
formed or uniform decision process and the judicial nature of the one-House action. See INS 
v. Chadha, 103 S.Ct. at 2771 & n.3; id. at 2788 (Powell, J., concurring). 
When one House of Congress disapproves executive deferrals, however, Congress already has 
considered the particular budget authority deferred and delivered its policy choice in legislation 
in accordance with article I's procedures. Section 1013(b) seems consistent with the Constitu-
tion's framers' "determination that legislation by the national Congress be a step-by-step, deliberate 
and deliberative process." Id. at 2788. The use of the legislative veto in such matters does not 
strongly threaten to damage "fixed principles of reason" or to promote arbitrary rule. Even 
the executive branch appears to agree that section 1013(b) does not present as severe challange 
to article I as other legislative vetos such as section 244(c)(2). See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE, 96T_H CONG., 2D SESS., STUDIES ON THE LEGISLTIVE VETO 2 (Comm. Print 1980) (com-
ments of Louis Fisher). 
35. Additionally, section 1013(b) closely resembles section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act in form. Each provision specifies that a one-House disapproval resolution shall 
defeat executive action authorized by its respective statute, and authorizes one House of Con-
gress to reverse executive action that would remain effective without the passage of a disapproval 
resolution. Nevertheless, the presumption of constitutionality that the Court attaches to congres-
sional statutes, see generally INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2674, 2780-81 (1983), indicates that 
· § 1013(b)'s character and effect, not merely its form, will determine whether that section will 
constitute legislative action subject to article I. See id. at 2784. 
36. 2 U.S.C. § 684(b) (1982). 
3 7. Id. § 684(a). 
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the constitutional basis of executive impoundment, 38 section 1013(a) 
grants the President statutory authority to defer the spending of 
congressionally appropriated funds. 39 Section 1013(b), however, allows 
a one-House resolution to compel the Executive to exercise deferred 
budget authority. "Congress has acted and its action has altered" the 
Executive's legal duties. 40 
2. The Nature of Section 1013(b) Action- According to the Court's 
reasoning in Chadha, one-House congressional action under section 
1013(b) manifests a legislative nature. The nature of Congress's choice 
to delegate to the Executive the statutory authority to def er budget 
authority parallels the nature of Congress's choice to prohibit a par-
ticular executive deferral. Congressional enactment of Title X involved 
policy determinations regarding whether and how to grant the Executive 
flexibility in and temporary control over the timing of federal spending. 41 
One-House impoundment resolutions likewise involve policy determina-
tions regarding the wisdom of particular executive deferrals. 42 
3. The Legislative Character of the Supplanted Decision- Prior 
to Title X, impoundment conflicts between Congress and the President 
centered around the issue of whether Congress must enact legislation 
beyond original appropriations legislation to def eat executive 
impoundments. 43 Congressional leaders generally maintained that Con-
gress needed no further legislation to compel spending funds already 
appropriated. 44 The executive branch, however, proclaimed that only 
mandatory spending language would remove the Executive's prerogative 
to impound in certain circumstances. 45 Additionally, President Nixon 
declared that the Executive possessed a constitutional right to impound 
that was immune to legislative attack. 46 The federal judiciary skirted 
38. The disclaimer section of Title X, section 1001, begins: "Nothing contained in this Act, 
or in any amendments made by this Act, shall be construed as- (I) asserting or conceding the 
constitutional powers or limitations of either Congress or the President." 2 U.S.C. § 681(1) (1982). 
For explanations of Congress' intention regarding this disclaimer, see 120 CONG. REC. 20,464-65 
(1974) (REMARKS OF SEN. ERVIN) (concluding that Congress did not grant a general impound-
ment power) and COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 7, at 12. 
39. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 7, at 14; see also supra text accompanying notes 
129-30. A full discussion concerning the exact nature of Title X's delegation of power is beyond 
the scope of this Note. 
41. For a brief discussion of the need for some degree of executive flexibility over the timing 
of spending budget authority, see 120 CoNG. REC. 20,464-65 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Ervin). 
42. For a discussion and analysis of congressional consideration of deferral messages, see 
Schick, supra note 9, at 8-24. 
43. For a general discussion of the Nixon Administration's claims of executive authority 
to impound and congressional counter claims, see FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 175-97 
(1975). 
44. Id. at 179. 
45. For a brief discussion of the Executive's traditional statutory and managerial claims to 
impound appropriated funds, see id. at 147-58. 
46. 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 110 (1973). For analyses of the Executive's constitutional 
claims to impound funds, see FISHER, supra note 43, at 158-164; Note, Impoundment of Funds, 
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the constitutional issues and focused instead upon whether the par-
ticular appropriations legislation allowed discretionary executive 
spending. 47 The impoundment cases generally ruled against the Presi-
dent's claim to impound on the ground that the particular appropria-
tions statutes made executive spending mandatory. 48 Nevertheless, the 
judiciary's investigation of statutory language in order to resolve im-
poundment disputes implicitly recognizes the validity of impoundments 
that are not specifically prohibited by legislation. 49 
Furthermore, prior to Title X, Congress enacted legislation50 - and, 
subsequent to Title X, Congress has used legislations ' - to limit 
Presidents' impoundments of budget authority. Section 1013(1?) 
augments congressional control over executive impoundments, exer-
cised previously and currently through legislative action subject to article 
I's prescriptions, with a legislative veto provision. 
Section 1013(b), therefore, appears legislative in purpose, effect and 
nature, and supplants article I congressional action. 52 Under the Court's 
constitutional analysis in Chadha, section 1013(b) is unconstitutional 
because "it [is] an exercise of legislative power" that is neither sub-
jected to article I's legislative enactment procedures nor "within any 
of the express constitutional exceptions authorizing one House to act 
alone." Assuming section 1013(b)'s unconstitutionality, the issue of 
section 1013(b)'s severability from the Congressional Budget and Im-
poundment Control Act arises. 
The subsequent section seeks to delineate the basic issues in sever-
ability conflicts and to establish the groundwork for Part Ill's severabili-
ty model. 
86 HARV. L. REV. 1505, 1513-16 (1973). 
47. See, e.g., Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975) (holding that the Clean Water 
Act required "full" allotment); Abascal & Kramer, Presidential lmpoundment Part II: Judicial 
and Legisiative Responses, 63 GEO. L. REV. 149, 149-68 (1974). 
48. Abascal & Kramer, supra note 47, at 151; Schick, supra note 9, at 5. For the single 
Supreme Court interpretation of mandatory spending language, see Train v. City of New York, 
420 U.S. 35 (1975). 
49. Abascal & Kramer, supra note 47, at 150-51. 
50. For discussions regarding various statutory limitations upon Executive impoundment prior 
to Title X's enactment, see Note, supra note 46, at 1516-29; FISHER, supra note 43, 152-58. 
51. Congress still employs mandator)' spending language to prohibit anticipated impound-
ments (deferrals). For example, in the Department of Transportation Appropriations Act of I 982 
Congress disallowed any deferral of particular transportation budget items. Pub. L. No. 97-102, 
§ 406, 95 Stat. 1442, 1466 (1981). 
In its only disapproval of a deferral message since Chadha, Congress disapproved of the defer-
ral of budget authority for the United States Railway Association (D84-20) in a rider to a sup-
plemental appropriations act. Supplemental Appropriations Act, Domestic Housing and Interna-
tional Recovery and Financial Stability Act, Pub. L. No. 98-181, tit. XI, ch. V, 97 Stat. 1153, 
1296 (1983). 
52. See supra text accompanying notes 36-51. 
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II. THE TRADITIONAL SEVERABILITY DOCTRINE 
The severability doctrine is a judicially created principle. 53 The doc-
trine provides that a partially unconstitutional statute's valid provi-
sion(s) remain effective if severable from the statute's invalid provi-
sion(s). 54 The federal and state judiciary adopted the doctrine long ago. 55 
The earliest cases mentioning the doctrine investigated and prescribed 
the currently relevant judicial considerations regarding statutes' 
severability. 56 
Generally, two considerations are relevant in determining the 
severability of an invalid statutory provision from the statute's re-
mainder: first, whether the legislature would have enacted the statute 
without the invalid provision; and second, whether the statute remains 
legally and administratively operative without the invalid provisions. 57 
Legislative intent, therefore, is the overarching consideration in judicial 
determinations of severability. 58 
Judicial determinations of legislative intent are inherently subjective, 59 
and this subjectivity leads to widely disparate results among cases in-
volving the resolution of statutes' severability. Judges on the same bench 
53. For a full discussion of the origins and development of the severability doctrine, see Stern, 
supra note 15. 
54. An invalid word, clause,sentence, or action may be severed. See Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Stern, supra note 15, at 106. 
55. E.g., Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley's Lessee 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 492, 526 (1829); Clark v. 
Ellis, 2 Blackf. 8, 11-12 (Ind. 1826). Stern, supra note 15, at 79-82. 
56. E.g., Warren v. Mayor of Charlestown, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 84, 99 (1854); Note, Effect 
of Separability Clauses in Statutes, 40 HARV. L. REV. 626 (1927); Stern, supra note 15, at 80. 
57. E.g., INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2774 (1983); Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 
290 (1924) (criminal conviction of union leader invalid because unconstitutional compulsory 
arbitration provision inserverable from remainder of the statute); Stern, supra note 15, at 76. 
58. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2816-17 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 312 (1936) (price fixing provisions of the Bituminous 
Coal Conservation Act of 1935 inseverable from the unconstitutional_ labor regulatory provi-
sions); Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 (1924). Legislative intent, of course, discloses whether 
the legislature would have enacted the statute without its invalid provision(s). Additionally, legislative 
intent reveals whether the remaining valid portions of the statute continue their administrative 
operation in the manner intended by the legislature. 
59. For a recent illustration of this subjectivity, compare Grove City College v. Bell, 104 
S. Ct. 1211, 1220-22 (1984) (holding that legislative intent indicates that Title IX prohibits gender 
discrimination in higher education in specific programs receiving federal aid) with id. at 1231-35 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that legislative intent clearly shows that Congress intended 
Title IX to have institution-wide coverage). On its own, Justice White's opinion for the Court 
in Grove City College highlights the subjectivity of judicial interpretations of legislative intent. 
In Chadha, Justice White posited that a one-House resolution, despite Chadha, "could be read 
as a manifestation of legislative intent, which, unless itself contrary to the authorizing statute, 
serves as the definitive construction of the statute." INS v. Chadha, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2796 n.11 
(1983). Yet in Grove City College Justice White did not mention the fact that in November 
1983 the House of Representatives voted 414-8 in support of a one-House resolution that pro-
claimed the broad institution-wide scope of Title IX. H.R. Res. 198, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); 
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reading the same statutory language and legislative history frequently 
reach opposing conclusions as to whether legislative intent directs that 
valid statutory language60 stand or fall without the statute's invalid 
provision(s). 61 Consequently, courts' unfettered discretion in determining 
statutes' severability is the "significant feature" of severability 
controversies. 62 A modified version of the traditional approach to 
severability disputes, however, may decrease the number of disparate 
judicial evaluations of a particular statute's severability. 
III. SEVERABILITY MODEL 
Subjectivity permeates determinations of th~ severability of statutory 
provisions. 63 Still, that subjectivity does not prevent the formulation 
of a method of analysis. This section develops a severability model 
that suggests relevant questions and discards irrelevant considerations 
regarding the severability doctrine generally and particularly as applied 
to statutes containing legislative veto provisions. 
129 CONG. REC. Hl0085-95, HIOI00-101 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1983). See Grove City College, 
104 S. Ct. at 4295 n. 12 (Brennan, J ., dissenting). For a discussion of whether legislative intent 
may be a fictional concept, see J. HURST, DEALING WJTH STATUTES 32-40 (1982) (examining Max 
Radin's classic arguments concerning the unintelligibility of legislative intent). 
60. Severability issues are split into two broad categories: (!) severable language-whether 
constitutional language is severable from unconstitutional language within a statute; and (2) 
severable applications-whether constitutional applications of a statutory provision are severable 
from unconstitutional applications. Stern, supra note 15, at 78-79. The severability of legislative 
veto provisions is a question of severable language; consequently, this Note's discussion only 
concerns severable language situations. Although the question of severable applications involves 
the same general considerations of legislative intent, severable applications controversies are an 
offshoot of the original severability doctrine. Id. at I 15. Determination of whether a statute 
has severable applications primarily concerns statutory construction problems, i.e., whether a 
court should limit a statute's scope to constitutional applications and read unconstitutional ap-
plications out of the statute. Id. at 82. For a recent examination of severable applications prob-
lems, see Note, Extension versus Invalidation of Underinclusive Statutes: A Remedial Alternative, 
12 CowM. J.L. & Soc. PRoas. 115 (1975). 
61. Compare INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2774 (1983) (Burger, C.J.) (arguing that the 
Immigration and Nationality Act's legislative history supports the conclusion that section 244(c)(2)'s 
one-House veto provision is severable) with id. at 2816-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (concluding 
that legislative history indicates that section 244(c)(2) is inseverable from Congress' delegation 
of authority to suspend aliens' deportation (§ 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act)). 
62. Stern, supra note 15, at 110-11. For a recent example of judicial discretion regarding 
the finding of severability, compare EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 570 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D. Miss. 
1983) (holding the one-House legislative veto provision of the Reorganization Act of 1977 in-
severable, and, consequently, invalidating Reorganization Plan No. I of 1978 which transferred, 
the enforcement of the Equal Pay Act from the Labor Department to the EEOC), appeal dismissed, 
104 S. Ct. 3499 (1984) with Muller Optical Co. v. EEOC, 574 F. Supp. 946 (W.D. Tenn. 1983) 
(finding the Reorganization Act of 1977's legislative veto provision severable from remainder 
of the Act, and, consequently, maintaining Reorganization Plan No. I of 1978, which also trans-
ferred enforcement of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act from the Labor Department 
to the EEOC); see also cases cited supra note 14. 
63. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. 
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A. Inappropriateness of Presumptions Regarding 
Statutes' Severability 
Courts approach severability conflicts armed with numerous presump-
tions concerning statutes' severability or inseverability. For example, 
the presence or absence of a severability clause64 frequently creates a 
presumption in favor of or in opposition to a statute's severability. 65 
Additionally, the character of the constitutionally infirm provision often 
creates a presumption regarding a statute's severability. 66 Courts should 
not, however, use any presumptions regarding a statute's severability 
other than the general interpretative presumptions of constitutionality 
and the judicial duty to uphold as much of a statute as legally per-
missible and consistent with legislative intent. 67 Standardized presump: 
tions of severability or inseverability, particularly as applied to the 
severability of legislative veto provisions, pose several problems. 
First, presumptions mask a consideration that frequently determines 
a statute's severability - the substance and scope of the particular 
64. Section 406 of the Immigration and Nationality Act presents a typical severability clause: 
"If any particular provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, 
is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of such provision to other persons 
or circumstances shall not be affected thereby." 8 U.S.C. § llOI (1982). 
65. For language citing the absence of a severability clause as evidence of a statute's in-
severability, see Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 241 (1928). In Williams, Justice 
Sutherland originally stated the standard presumptions regarding the presence or absence of a 
severability clause: 
In the absence of such a legislative declaration, the presumption is that the legislature 
intends an act to be effective as an entirety . . . . 
The effect of the statutory declaration (a severability clause) is to create in the 
place of the presumption just stated the opposite one of separability. That is to say, 
we begin, in the light of the declaration, with the presumption that the legislature 
intended the act to be divisible; and this presumption must be overcome by considera-
tions which make evident the inseparability of its provisions or the clear probability 
that the invalid part being eliminated the legislature would not have been satisfied 
with what remains. 
Id. at 241, 242. 
For language emphasizing the importance of the presence of a severability clause, see INS 
v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2774 (1983) ("we need not embark on that elusive inquiry since 
Congress itself has provided the answer to the question of severability in [the presence of a severabil-
ity clause)"); Consumer Energy Council of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 
673 F.2d 425, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (presence of severability clause "makes it extremely difficult 
for a party to demonstrate inseverbility"), aff'd mem. sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group 
v. Consumers Energy Council of Am., 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983). For language vitiating severability 
clauses, see United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n.27 (1968) (resolution of severability 
controversies "will rarely turn on the presence or absence of such a clause"); INS v. Chadha, 
103 S. Ct. at 2816 (Rehnquist, J ., dissenting) (quoting Jackson). 
66. E.g., Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515, 525 (1929) (a statutory amendment 
unconstitutional yet severable); Davis v. Wallace, 257 U.S. 478, 484-85 (1921) (an excepting pro-
vision unconstitutional and inseverable). 
67. See Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1083-84 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (Skelton, J., concur-
ring and dissenting) (finding one-House legislative veto of the Federal Salary Act of 1967 con-
stitutional); Stern, supra note 15, at 120 nn.199-200. 
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statute. 68 Although lack of judicial candor frequently proves troublesome 
in itself, 69 a greater harm exists if a court mechanically assumes that 
it has preserved congressional intent by severing significant legislation. 
Many legislative veto provisions are within major, comprehensive 
legislation. 10 Yet courts should not hastily find that such legislation 
includes distinct and severable purposes, but should respect congres-
sional intent and examine the legislative circumstances of each act's 
adoption. 11 Legislative veto provisions often constitute the essential ele-
ment in significant statutory delegations of legislative authority. 72 The 
severance of a legislative veto provision, therefore, may have the 
unintended effects of deference to the Executive branch and frustra-
tion of congressional intent. Courts _should recognize that in saving 
the bulk of a statute they may destroy the legislative scheme. 
Second, courts do not consistently apply these presumptions. The 
Supreme Court has relied heavily upon presumptions regarding 
severability. 73 In other cases, the Court has disparaged such 
presumptions. 74 Uncertainty results for both litigants and legislative 
draftsmen. This uncertainty seems especially onerous considering the 
numerous statutes containing legislative veto provisions. 
Finally, the use of severability presumptions debases the importance 
of legislative intent in severability conflicts. Generalized presumptions 
68. See Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 n.40 
(1982) (comprehensive restructuring of bankruptcy laws precludes severance of any matter related 
to Title II from bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,684 (1971) 
(act likely severable because important and broad statutory goals); Utah Power & Light Co. 
v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165, 185 (1932) (comprehensive energy regulatory statute likely severable because 
broad scope). 
69. See Stern, supra note 15, at 114. Severability or inseverability presumptions acting as 
camouflage for opinions based upon other reasoning are troublesome for two reasons. First, 
the judiciary misleads the legislature into believing that severability clauses are effective. Legislatures 
often respond mechanically, with careless, overinclusive draftsmanship. For example, the presump-
tion of severability in constitutional litigation involving a statute with a severability clause may 
encourage states to enact general severability statutes applicable to all state statutes. See general-
ly Note, The Michigan General Separability Statute, 46 CoLUM. L. REV. 623, 628-629 (1947) 
(concluding that general severability statutes have little impact upon judicial determinations). 
Second, dissimilar results regarding severability conflicts arise in similar situations because dif-
ferent courts have different views of the substantive worth of the same statute. See Stern, supra 
15, at 112-114. Consequently, unpredictability reigns in adjudications raising severability con-
flicts. See cases cited supra note 62. 
70. See, e.g., Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 43(f)(3), 92 Stat. 
1705, 1752, 49 U.S.C. 1552(f) (Supp. III 1979) (one-House disapproval resolution defeats rules 
and regulations governing employee protection program). See also INS v. Chadha, 103 S.Ct. 
2764, 2811-16 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (Appendix I-collection of major statutes containing 
legislative veto provisions). 
71. See Jackson v. United States, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n.27 (1968) (finding federal kidnap 
statute severable). 
72. See McCorkle v. U.S., 559 F.2d 1258, 1261 (4th Cir. 1977) (legislative veto inseverable 
from Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970). 
73. E.g., INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2774 (1983) (presence of severability clause means 
"Congress itself has provided the answer to the question of severability"). 
74. E.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n.27 (1968) (the presence or absence 
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regarding all statutes' severability do not reveal the legislative intent 
behind a particular suspect statute, and instead, obscure the ques-
tion of whether the legislature would have enacted the statute without 
the constitutionally infirm provisions. 75 Because of the varied nature 
and purposes of legislative vetos, judicial inquiry should focus upon 
the specific legislative intent behind statutes with legislative veto pro-
visions, rather than upon general presumptions of severability or 
inseverability. 76 Standardized presumptions of severability or insever-
ability are inadequate proxies for close scrutiny of the legislative m-
tent surrounding particular statutes. 
B. Determination of Legislative Intent 
Any determination of whether the legislature would have enacted 
a statute without its unconstitutional provision(s) should hinge upon 
the legislative intent surrounding that particular statute. 77 Courts should 
consider the following factors, when applicable, in order to determine 
whether the legislature would have enacted the statute absent unconstitu-
tional parts. 
1. Severability Clauses- Legislatures often use severability clauses 
indiscriminately. 18 Numerous examples exist to illustrate that although 
a legislature has included a severability clause, frequently it would not 
have enacted the legislation without the invalid provision(s). 79 Addi-
tionally, a severability clause without specific application does not 
accurately indicate whether the legislature would have enacted the statute 
without a particular suspect provision. 
A severability clause, therefore, accurately and fully indicates 
legislative intent only when it specifically corresponds to particular sec-
of a severability clause "rarely" determines severability questions). 
75. See Consumers Energy Council of Am. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 
425, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding a one-House legislative veto provision in the Natural Gas 
Policy Act of 1978 unconstitutional and severable) ("We think the question where the presump-
tion lies is mostly irrelevant, and serves only to obscure the crucial inquiry whether Congress 
would have enacted other portions of the statute in the absence of the invalidated provision."), 
aff'd mem. sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumers Energy Council of Am., 
103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983); see also United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n.27 (1968). 
76. See Consumers Energy Council of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 
F.2d 425, 445 n.70 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd mem. sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. 
Consumers Energy Council of Am., 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983). But see Mccorkle v. United States, 
559 F.2d 1258, 1261 (4th Cir. 1977) (provisions such as legislative vetos, that restrict the delega-
tion of congressional authority, are presumptively inseverable). 
77. See, e.g., Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1973) (refusing to limit application 
of state act reimbursing tax money to parents with children in private sectarian schools because 
of legislative intent surrounding that particular statute, although severability clause present). 
78. Stern, supra note 15, at 122 n.209; Note, supra note 56, at 629. 
79. E.g., Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 71 (1922) ("interwoven" provisions); Spokane Ar-
cades, Inc. v. Brockett, 631 F.2d 135, 139 (9th Cir. 1980) (unconstitutional prior restraint provi-
sion clearly inseverable from moral nuisance statute enacted to allow rapid state action even 
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tions or prov1s1ons of a statute. 8° Courts should accordingly discon-
tinue their reliance upon nonspecific severability clauses as proof of 
a statute's severability. 81 
Similarly, the absence of a severability clause should not create a 
presumption of inseverability. 82 In countless instances, a legislature has 
failed to include a severability clause, but clearly would have enacted 
the legislation without the invalid provisions. 83 The absence of a 
severability clause typically indicates careless drafting or the draftsman's 
relative certainty of the statute's constitutionality. 84 Regardless of the 
explanation, the absence of a severability clause alone _reveals no 
legislative intent regarding a statute's severability. 85 
2. Nature of Legislative Veto Provisions- Congress includes 
legislative veto provisions in statutes for three general reasons: (1) as 
conditions upon the delegation of legislative authority; (2) as restraints 
upon previously delegated legislative authority; and (3) as procedural 
links to resolve constitutional disputes between the President and Con-
though severability clause present), aff'd mem. 454 U.S. 1022 (1981). 
80. The Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484, 613, § 846 con-
tains a specific severability clause: 
If any provision of, or any amendment made by, titles I and IV of this Act is held 
invalid by reason of being inconsistent with the Constitution, all provisions of this 
Act and amendments made by this Act which are separable from such invalid provi-
sion or amendment shall remain in effect. 
Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 846. Incidently, the Act contains a legislative veto provision but not in 
either Title I or Title IV. Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 509. For further examples of specific severability 
clauses, see Carter v. Gallagher, 337 F. Supp. 626, 628 (D. Minn. 1971) (severability clause making 
amendments to a specific section of the statute severable from the original act); See generally 
Stern, supra note 15, at 126 n.215, 127 n.216; see also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1981) 
(a specific inseverability clause). 
81. See Stern, supra note 15, at 125-28 (proposing a similar suggestion, and presenting the 
arguments in support of and opposition to specific severability clauses). 
82. Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1085 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (Skelton, J., concurring and 
dissenting) (presenting the argument that recent Supreme Court cases reject a presumption of 
inseverability in the absence of a severability clause: "Thus it seems clear ... that there is no 
automatic presumption of inseverability just because of the absence of a specific severability 
clause."); Stern, supra note 15, at 125. An inseverability clause, however, is so unique that it 
undoubtedly demonstrates legislative reluctance to enact the statute except in entirety. Zobel v. 
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1981) (statute granting state residents dividends from state mineral 
income on basis of length of residency unconstitutional and inseverable, although "it is ... 
for the Alaska courts to pass on the severability"). In Zobel the inseverability clause read: "If 
any provisions enacted in sec. 2 of this Act ... is held to be invalid by the final judgment, 
decision or order of a court of competent jurisdiction, then that provision is nonseverable, and 
all provisions enacted in sec. 2 of this Act are invalid and of no force or effect." Id. at 65. 
83. E.g., Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19 (1909) (although no severability clause, 
statutory provision regulating gas line pressure unconstitutional and severable from comprehen-
sive public utility regulatory statute); Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1981) (statutory 
provision regulating minor's abortion unconstitutional and inseverable from subsection, but re-
mainder of the Florida Medical Practice Act remains valid, although no severability clause). 
84. Stern, supra note 15, at 125. · 
85. In fact, frequent legislative use of the severability clause prompted courts to adopt the 
presumption of inseverability when a statute is without a severability clause. See generally Stern, 
supra note 15, at 120-2 I. 
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gress over the exercise of authority within the "zone of twilight. " 86 
Each of the three categories corresponds with traditional factors con-
sidered in resolving whether a legislature would have enacted a statute 
without its unconstitutional provisions. Therefore, courts may continue 
to use the traditional language of severability inquiries along with special 
consideration for the severability of legislative veto provisions. 
a. Conditions upon Delegation- Congress frequently employs a 
legislative veto as a condition upon its delegation of authority to the 
Executive Branch or an independent agency. 87 In such circumstances, 
the politie;al actors involved realize that "[t]he authority and the 
legislative veto are inseparable; the Administration could not have had 
the authority without the condition. " 88 In the traditional nomenclature 
of severability conflicts, the presence of a legislative veto induced the 
statute's enactment. Consequently, the remainder of the statute is 
inseverable, 89 unless the unconstitutional provision only induced the 
enactment of a section without which the statute would have been 
enacted. 
The label of "inducement clause," however, refers only to a con-
clusion derived from a thorough examination of a statute's legislative 
history. For example, statutory statements of purpose, legislative reports, 
roll-call votes, and legislative debate all serve to reveal the statutory 
purposes that induced enactment. 90 Such examinations will not eliminate 
disputes regarding a statute's severability; however, they will focus 
judicial scrutiny upon legislative purpose instead of statutory form. 
b. Restraints Upon Previous Delegation- Congress occasionally 
adds a legislative veto to previously enacted statutes in order to recap-
86. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 34, at 14 (from introduction by Louis 
Fisher). For a discussion of the "zone of twilight" between presidential and congressional authority, 
see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
87. Examples of legislative vetos operating as conditions upon delegated authority include: 
Federal Education Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, §109, 93 Stat. 
1339 1364, 2 U.S.C. 438(d)(2)(1982) (Federal Election Commission given authority to promulgate 
rules but one-House disapproval resolution retained by Congress); Act of November 16, 1973, 
Pub. L. No. 93-153, § IOI, 87 Stat. 576, 582, 30 U.S.C. § 185(u) (1976) (concurrent resolution 
maintained to limit grant of authority to President for determinations whether oil exports are 
in national interest). See also INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2795 nn.8-9 (1983) (White, J., 
dissenting). 
88. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 34, at 14 (comments of L. Fisher). The 
President and administration officials, at times, explicitly agree to the legislative veto as a condi-
tion to greater authority. See Message to Congress Regarding Legislative Vetos, 14 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. Doc. 1146, 1147 (June 21, I 978) (President Carter arguing against the use of legislative 
vetos except in Reorganization Acts which grant the Executive broad authority to reorganize 
the executive branch); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 34, at 2. 
89. E.g., Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 366-67 (1915) (unconstitutional Grandfather 
clause in state suffrage act induced literacy requirement). 
90. For a recent, general discussion of the various sources of legislative history and their 
relative worth, see Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme 
Court Term, 68 IowA L. REV. 195 (1983). 
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ture authority that is slipping from its control. 91 Such legislative veto 
provisions are amendments to statutes. Generally, courts sever amend-
ments to previously enacted legislation because the legislature enacted 
the statute without the invalid amendment. 92 Legislative veto provi-
sions added as amendments, however, represent congressional reasser-
tion and strengthening of authority. 93 Courts, therefore, should especially 
scrutinize the legislative history surrounding the amending process in 
order to ascertain whether Congress would have repealed the statute 
(entirely or partially) without the addition of the legislative veto. If 
legislative history reveals that Congress would have repealed the statute 
absent the addition of the legislative veto, the statute should fall with 
the legislative veto provision. 
c. Procedural links- Legislative vetos also serve to resolve the Presi-
dent's and Congress's competing constitutional claims to authority. 9• 
Congress emp!oys legislative vetos in the "zone of twilight" between 
executive and congressional power when "[u]nable to define by statute 
the precise [substantive] boundary between the branches. " 95 Such 
legislative vetos, in traditional severability analysis, constitute major 
provisions. 
Major provisions, generally, guarantee the fulfillment of a statute's 
principal purpose(s). 96 Typical examples of major provisions include 
remedy, enforcement, and exception clauses. 97 The determinative ques-
91. Examples of legislative vetos added as restraints upon previously delegated authority in-
clude: International Security Assistance Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-92, §16, 91 Stat. 614, 622, 
22 U .S.C. § 2753(d)(2) (1982) (concurrent resolution used to disapprove arms transfers); Export-
Import Bank Amendments-of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-646, §8, 88 Stat. 2333, 2336, 12 U.S.C. 
635e (1982) (concurrent resolution required to approve President's limitation for exports to USSR 
in excess of $300,000,000). . 
92. See, e.g., Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515, 525-26 (1929) (provision requir-
ing a license to operate a cotton gin, added as an amendment, severable because otherwise the 
amendment would work as a repeal). 
93. See Congressional Research Service, supra note 34, at 14-15. 
94. Examples of statutes that contain legislative vetos to resolve competing constitutional 
claims to authority between the political branches include: National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. 
No. 94-412, §202, 90 Stat. 1255, 50 U.S.C. 1622(a)(I) (1976) (concurrent resolution may ter-
minate presidentially declared national emergency); War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 
§5, 87 Stat. 555, 556-57, 50 U.S.C. 1544(c) (1976) (concurrent resolution may require President 
to remove armed forces from foreign combat absent a declaration of War). Currently, Congress 
is considering replacing the concurrent resolution in the War Powers Resolution with a joint 
resolution that meets article I's standards for legislation. See S. 1906, 98th Cong., !st Sess., 
129 CONG. REc. Sl3,244-46 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983). 
95. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 34, at 15. 
96. See, e.g., Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 366-67 (1915) (Grandfather clause in 
state suffrage act "so connected" to denial of black suffrage that entire act must fall); Carter 
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 314-16 (1936) (unconstitutional price fixing provisions essen-
tial to comprehensive reform legislation). 
97. See Davis v. Wallace, 257 U.S. 478, 484-85 (1921) (excepting proviso); Spokane Arcades 
Inc. v. Brockett, 631 F.2d 135, 139 (9th Cir. 1980) (enforcement provision), aff'd mem., 454 
U.S. 1022 (1981). 
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tion is whether a provision proves essential to the fulfillment of the 
statute's purpose(s). 98 If a statutory provision is such an essential in-
gredient, then the legislature probably would not have enacted the statute 
without such a provision. Therefore, such a major provision is in-
severable from the statute's remainder. 
As in determinations regarding inducement clauses, determinations 
of whether statutory provisions prove essential to the fulfillment of 
a statute's purpose(s) involve thorough examination of legislative history. 
Inherent uncertainty pervades such inquiry. 99 Yet emphasis upon whether 
a legislative veto provision, for instance, represents a major provision 
properly shifts judicial scrutiny from statutory form to legislative 
purpose. 
C. Statutory Operation after Judicial Review 
The second broad category of concern regarding severability con-
flicts is a statute's operation after judicial review. 100 After a court deter-
mines that a legislature would have enacted a statute without its in-
valid provision(s), it determines whether the statute remains legally and 
administratively operative without the unconstitutional provision(s). 101 
Legislatures are presumed to enact legislation to impose legal obliga-
tions and to grant legal rights. Accordingly, a legislature would not 
enact a legally inoperative statute. If a statute, therefore, becomes legally 
inoperative upon the excision of invalid statutory provisions, the statute 
falls entirely. 
Additionally, a statute's administrative operation after the removal 
of unconstitutional provisions is a factor in a determination of 
severability. 102 If the unconstitutional provisions pertain to the ad-
ministration of a statute, the statute may become administratively dif-
ficult to implement or enforce after the invalid provisions' severance. 
The Supreme Court appears reluctant to impose burdensome ad-
ministrative duties that did not exist in the original statutory scheme 
98. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 591 (1968); Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 
278 U.S. 515, 525-26 (1929) (amendment to statute not essential to act's purpose); Williams v. 
Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 241-45 (1928) (finding that a provision regulating gas prices 
was a major provision and, therefore, inseverable). 
99. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. 
100. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2775-76 (1983); Atkins v. United States, 
556 F.2d 1028, 1082 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (Skelton, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 434 
U.S.1009 (1978). 
IOI. See e.g., INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2775-76 (1983); United States v. Jackson, 
390 U.S. 570, 585 (1968); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 
(1932). 
102. E.g., INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2775 (198_3) ("workable administrative machinery 
[remains] without the [legislative] veto provision"); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 684 
(1971) (administration of the act impaired without the invalid provision). 
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upon government officials. 103 Consequently, statutes are inseverable 
if administration of the statute becomes unworkable or burdensome 
without the unconstitutional provision(s). 
IV. APPLICATION OF SEVERABILITY MODEL TO THE CONGRESSIONAL 
BUDGET AND IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT OF 1974 
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 
comprehensively reformed the federal budget process and impound-
ment control procedure. 104 Titles I-IX chiefly establish a timetable for 
evaluation and legislation of the Executive's yearly budget proposal, 
and unite congressional consideration of federal expenditures and 
revenue. 105 Title X, Impoundment Control, safeguards congressional 
choices regarding spending priorities. 106 Section 1013(b) of Title X 
employs a one-House legislative veto provision over executive defer-
rals of budget authority to accommodate the Executive's recognized 
need for some minimal flexibility in the timing of federal spendings 
with Congress's traditional power of the purse. Overall, the 1974 Act 
has achieved qualified reform where legislative reform packages have 
failed for the previous fifty years. 101 
The severability of section 1013(b) from the Congressional Budget 
and lmpoundment Control Act of 1974 (the Act) raises two fundamental 
questions: (1) whether section 1013(b) is severable from the remainder 
of Title X; and (2) if section 1013(b) and Title X must fall jointly, 
whether Title X is severable from Titles I-IX of the Act. 108 
103. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 684 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
104. See generally Fisher, supra note 2, at 413-414; A. SCHICK, CONGRESS AND MONEY 51-81 
(1980) (an excellent study of the congressional budget process and the events leading to the 1974 
Act). 
105. E.g., Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 2, 88 Stat. 297, 31 U.S.C. § 1301 (1982) (Declaration of 
purposes). See generally H.R. 7130-REPORT, supra note 3, at 19-25 (general background infor-
mation concerning the causes and aims of budget process reform); A. SCHICK, supra note 104, at 55. 
106. See, e.g., S. 373-REPORT, supra note 3, at 1, 19; H.R. 7130-REPORT, supra note 3, at 16, 15. 
107. E.g., A. SCHICK, supra note 104, at 51-52; J. PFIFFNER, supra note 3, at JJ0-114. See 
generally Note, supra note 46, at 1516-29 (discussion of congressional efforts to restrain presidential 
impoundments). 
108. Arguably the severability of section 1013(b) from the Congressional Budget and lm-
poundment Control Act raises a third question: whether § 1002 of Title X, amendments to the 
Antideficiency Act, is severable from Title X. The Comptroller General has argued "that section 
1002 is in fact an amendment to a statute ... separate and apart from the remainder of the 
sections making up the lmpoundment Control Act of 1974." COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 
7, at 9-10. Yet § 1002 is a part of Title X just as § 1016 (authorizing the Comptroller General 
to sue the Executive overimproperly proposed deferrals or rescissions) or § 1012 (authorizing 
the Executive to propose rescissions of budget authority) is a part of Title X. A statutory section 
is not severable from the remainder of a statute simply because the section also relates to a 
second statute. 
Section 1002 depends upon Title X for meaning. Section 1002, in addition to removing the 
clause "other developments" from the Antideficiency Act, serves to link Title X with the An-
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A. The Severability of Section 1013(b) from Title X 
1. Determination of Congressional Intent- Traditional severability 
analysis first requires determination of whether the legislature would 
have enacted the statute without the suspect provision. 109 The initial 
inquiry, therefore, regarding section 1013(b)'s severability from Title 
X becomes whether Congress would have enacted Title X without the 
one-House legislative veto provision. 
Congress did not make an explicit statement of its intent to enact 
Title X's provisions unconditioned upon other Title X provisions. The 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Title X) does not contain a 
severability clause. 110 S. 373, the original Senate version of Title X, 
did, however, contain a severability clause. 111 Legislative history does 
not explain why the severability clause in S. 373 disappeared when House 
and Senate conferees joined S. 373 and H.R. 8480 to form Title X. 112 
In any event, as discussed above, an inference of inseverability should 
not arise from the absence of a severability clause. 113 
Congress's struggles to restrain the Executive's power generally and 
to reassert its own power over the timing of government expenditures 
were the overarching political controversies of impoundment reform 
legislation. 114 Congress used section 1013(b)'s legislative veto as a con-
dition upon the de facto delegation of impoundment authority, 115 as 
a restraint upon the further erosion of congressional control over the 
timing of spending, 116 and as a procedural link between the President's 
tideficiency Act. See supra note 7. Title X, therefore, seems necessary to fulfill a fundamental 
purpose of§ 1002. In any event, once a court finds that Congress would not have enacted Title 
X without § l013(b), it could hardly find that Congress would nonetheless have enacted § 1002 
alone. Consequently, the severability of § 1002 from § 1013(b) depends upon whether Title X 
remains valid without § 1013(b). 
109. See supra text accompanying note 57. 
I IO. Furthermore, no severability clause exists in the remainder of the Congressional Budget 
and lmpoundment Control Act of 1974. 
111. s. 373, 93d Cong., !st Sess. § IO, I 19 CONG. REC. 1150-52 (1973). s. 373 was originally 
an anti-impoundment bill (no executive impoundment unless congressional approval). Anti-
impoundment legislation often included severability clauses. E.g., H.R. 6206, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess. § 401, 119 CONG. REC. 11384-86 (1973). 
112. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1101, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1974) (Conference Report-no 
explanation offered). H.R. 8480 did not contain a severability clause. See H.R. 8480, 93d Cong., 
!st Sess. (1973). H.R. 8480 is printed in Hearings before the House Comm. on Rules on H.R. 
5193 and Related Bills, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1973). 
113. See supra text accompanying notes 82-85. 
114. E.g., Levine, supra note 2; ]. PFIFFNER, supra note 3, at 1-7; A. SCHLESINGER, THE 
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 396-400 (1973); ]. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CON-
GRESS 1-2, (1981). 
115. See generally Comptroller General, supra note 7 (concluding that§ l013(b) grants tem-
porary impoundment authority where no other statutory authority exists). 
116. Section l013(b) limits the Executive's use of delegated impoundment authority under 
the Antideficiency Act of 1950, See Pub. L. No. 93-344 § 1002, 88 Stat. 297 (1974), 31 U.S.C. 
§ 665(c)(2) (1982). 
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and Congress's competing constitutional claims concerning 
impoundment. 111 The varied and occasionally multiple roles of legislative 
vetoes, such as section 1013(b}, compel courts to scrutinize legislative 
vetoes within their particular statutory framework and not within 
generalized models of severability. 118 The following analysis highlights 
section 1013(b)'s role in the formation of Title X and the unlikelihood 
of Title X's passage without section 1013(b). 
The central dispute in Congress regarding impoundment reform 
legislation was the approval mechanism by which executive impound-
ments became effective. 119 Specifically, the House and Senate split over 
whether executive impoundments should be effective unless congres-
sionally disapproved, 120 or ineffective unless congressionally approved. 121 
The two chambers of Congress differed so intransigently regarding the 
appropriate impoundment approval mechanism that S. 373 and H.R. 
8480 never surfaced after the appointment of a conference committee. 
in 1973. 122 
The conference committee on the Act resolved the impasse by com-
117. See generally A. ScmcK, supra note 9, at 28 (Title X provides a "legislative control 
procedure without reaching the constitutional issue of whether the President possesses any in-
herent power to impound."). Section 1001(1) of Title X disclaims any view regarding constitu-
tional justification for impoundments: "Nothing contained in this Act, or in any amendments 
made by this Act, shall be construed as (I) asserting or conceding the constitutional powers 
or limitations of either the Congress or the President." 2 U.S.C. § 681 (1982). Together, Section 
1013(b) and Title X serve to link procedurally the conflicting claims of the President and Con-
gress of ultimate control of speeding. Title X joins the principal statutory basis of impound-
ment, the Antideficiency Act, with Title X's procedural control over impoundment. "Reserves 
established pursuant to this subsection, [Antideficiency Act, as amended, 31 U .S.C. § 665(c)(2),) 
shall be reported to the Congress in accordance with the lmpoundment Control Act of 1974." 
Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 1002, 88 Stat. 297 (1974). See Comptroller General, supra note 7, at 14. 
I 18. Section 1013(b)'s severability from Title X does not depend upon whether§ 1013 delegates 
impoundment authority. Section 1013(b)'s various roles - as a condition upon de facto delega-
tion, a limit upon previous delegation, and a procedural link between the political branches -
demonstrate the futility of pigeonholing when determining the severability of a legislative veto 
provision. Even if Title X does not delegate authority to the Executive, § 1013(b)'s importance 
to Title X and the Act does not diminish. Section 1013(b)'s other roles would survive a finding 
that § 1013 does not restrict the congressional power to delegate authority. Regarding the severability 
of§ 1013(b) from Title X, the principal question remains unchanged: would Congress have enacted 
Title X without § 1013(b)? But see Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 30 (comments of Richard Ehlke). 
This Note assumes that Title X, at least, delegated de facto authority. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 130-3 I. 
119. E.g., 120 CONG. REC. 7657-58 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Muskie); 119 CONG. REC. 25,563 
(1973) (remarks of Rep. Pickle); Schick, supra note 9, at 42. 
120. H.R. 8480 required congressional action, a one-House disapproval resolution, to defeat 
an impoundment of funds. H.R. 7130-REPORT, supra note 3, at 17-18. 
121. S. 373, as originally introduced, prohibited impoundments unless affirmatively approved 
by a concurrent resolution of Congress. lmpoundment of Appropriated Funds by the President: 
Joint Hearings on S. 373 Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on lmpoundment of Funds of the Senate 
Comm. of Government Operations and the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., !st Sess. 9-10 (1973) (version of S. 373 as introduced by 
Sen. Ervin on January 16, 1973) [hereinafter cited as S. 373-Hearings]. 
122. "Neither side was interested in going to conference because there was now way of com-
promising those two fundamentally contrary theories." 120 CONG. REC. 7658 (1974) (remarks 
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bining the approval mechanisms of S. 373 and H.R. 8480. 123 Congres-
sional leaders later stated that the impoundment reform stalemate would 
have remained unresolved without the conference committee's 
compromise. 124 Section 1013(b) functioned as the linchpin to that com-
promise. Section 1013(b)'s one-House veto over executive deferrals pro-
vides the Executive flexibility over ministerial decisions to delay spend-
ings, and ensures close congressional supervision over the timing of 
federal expenditures. Congress, therefore, would not have passed im-
poundment reform legislation without a legislative veto provision. 
Additionally, Congress explicitly sought a mechanism to rescind im-
poundments without further legislation, and to eliminate the necessity 
of providing all appropriations legislation with mandatory spending 
language. 125 On several occasions, Congress rejected proposals that re-
quired legislation or bicameral action to defeat impoundments. The 
Senate rejected a proposal to allow impoundments unless Congress 
disapproved by joint resolution. 126 The House of Represent'atives re-
jected amendments to H.R. 8480 and H.R. 7130 that would have re-
quired a concurrent resolution of disapproval to defeat impoundments. 121 
Although federal courts generally found mandatory spending language 
within appropriations legislation, Congress did not wish to rely upon 
the judiciary to abrogate impoundments. 128 Congress finally agreed upon 
section 1013(b)'s deferral mechanism as the means to avoid the need 
for further legislation or mandatory spending language. 
Title X neither asserts nor concedes any constitutional or statutory 
authority regarding executive impoundments. 129 The deferral mechanism, 
however, marks a significant congressional concession to the Executive 
by legitimizing presidential impoundments. 130 Nevertheless, without sec-
tion 1013(b)'s one-House legislative veto provision, Congress would 
have, in effect, conceded that impoundments may constitutionally persist 
of Sen. Muskie). "[T]he conferees deferred action on the impoundment legislation pending con-
sideration of the congressional budget bill" after only one conference meeting. Schick, supra 
note 9, at 6. 
123. E.g., CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 79; A. SCHICK, supra note 104, at 70-71. 
Section 1012 incorporates S. 373's affirmative approval mechanism. Section 1013 incorporates 
H.R. 8480's negative approval mechanism. 
· 124. E.g., 120 CoNG. REC. 20, 464-65 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Ervin). 
125. E.g., 119 CONG. REC. 19, 334-35 (1973) (remarks of Rep. O'Neill); Abascal & Kramer, 
supra note 47, at 169, 179-80. 
126. S. 373-REPORT, supra note 3, at 2 (explanation of S. 373's background including rejec-
tion of S. 2027 which proposed that a joint resolution be required to defeat Executive 
impoundment). 
127. 119 CONG. REC. 25,573-76, 39,725-26 (1973) (Rep. Anderson's proposed amendments). 
On July 24, 1973, the House narrowly defeated (205-206) Rep. Anderson's amendment to H.R. 
8480. For a contemporary report of Rep. Anderson's efforts to amend H.R. 8480 (and later 
H.R. 7130), see 31 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2067 (1973). 
128. E.g., S. 373-REPORT, supra note 3, at 9. 
129. See supra note 38. 
130. E.g., Fisher, supra note 43, at 200-01; Abascal & Kramer, supra note 47, at 150-51. 
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in the absence of additional mandatory spending language. In 1974, 
Congress did not intend to expand executive discretion in such a 
manner. 131 
In summary, Congress would not have enacted Title X without sec-
tion 1013(b). Section 1013(b) limits executive discretion, and yet pro-
vides a procedural link between Congress' power of the purse and the 
President's claim to control partially the timing of expenditures. The 
removal of section 1013(b) would greatly expand executive power. 132 
No intent existed in the second session of the 93d Congress (1974) to 
expand Executive authority. Section 1013(b), therefore, is inseverable 
from Title X. 
2. Title X's Operation without Section 1013(b)- Congressional in-
tent surrounding impoundment reform legislation indicates that Con-
gress would not have enacted Title X without section 1013(b). 
Nonetheless, complete analysis of the severability of section 1013(b) 
from Title X requires examination of Title X's legal and administrative 
operation without section 1013(b). 133 The impoundment process in gen-
eral - and the deferral process in particular - would remain adminis-
tratively operative without section 1013(b)'s legislative veto. First, the 
President would remain compelled to report deferrals. 134 Second, defer-
rals still would not extend beyond the fiscal year in which the Executive 
proposed them. 135 Third, the President would remain prohibited from 
using the deferral mechanism to rescind or reserve funding. 136 Finally, 
Congress still could enact legislation def eating deferrals or attach deferral 
·disapproval riders to other legislation. 137 Congress and the Executive, 
131. For an excellent summary of Congress' efforts to reassert itself against the abuses of 
the Nixon administration, see J. SUNDQUIST, supra note 114, at 1-3. See generally A. SCHLES-
INGER, supra note 114 (historical overview of the ascendency of the Executive in the 20th century 
culminating in the Nixon presidency). 
132. Without § 1013(b), only legislation could limit the President's power to defer spending 
budget authority under Title X. Consequently, excision of§ 1013(b) broadens the Executive's 
control over the timing of federal expenditures. See Mccorkle v. United States, 559 F.2d 1258, 
1261 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978). The McCorkle court held a one-House 
legislative veto provision over presidential salary recommendations inseverable from the Federal 
Salary Act of 1967 becaust: "[w]hen the questioned clause restricts a power granted by the 
legislature, the case against severence is strong." But see Consumers Energy Council of Am. 
v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425, 445 n.70 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd mem. 
sub nom. Gas Consumers Group v. Consumers Energy Council of Am., 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983) 
(rejection of per se rule classifying legislative veto provisions as limitation clauses and, therefore, 
inseverable). The proposed severability model agrees with the D.C. Circuit's case by case ap-
proach to the severability of legislative veto provisions. See supra text accompanying notes 63-99. 
133. See supra text accompanying notes 100-03. 
134. 2 U.S.C. § 684(a) (1982). 
135. Id. 
136. Id. § 684(c) (1982). 
137. Subsequent to Chadha, Congress disapproved the deferral of budget authority for the 
United States Railway Association, attaching a disapproval rider to a supplemental appropria-
tions act to rescind the deferral. Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 98-181, tit. 
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in short, would possess the same reporting and other administrative 
responsibilities under Title X absent section 1013(b). Title X, therefore, 
would remain administratively operative without section 1013(b). 
Similarly, Title X would remain legally operative without section 
1013(b). Section 1013(b)'s absence would affect neither the distribu-
tion of constitutional power nor statutory authority regarding executive 
impoundments. 138 The Executive would remain statutorily authorized 
to defer budget authority at his discretion upon report to Congress. 139 
Although Title X remains legally and administratively operative 
without section 1013(b), Title X and section 1013(b) appear mutually 
dependent and therefore inseverable. Assuming the inseverability of 
section 1013(b) from Title X, the question then becomes whether Title 
X is severable from Titles I-IX of the Congressional Budget and Im-
poundment Control Act. 
B. The Severability of Title X from Titles I-IX 
Examination of the severability of Title X from Titles I-IX proceeds 
in the same manner as the examination of section 1013(b)'s severability 
from Title X, absent the modifications for the severability of legislative 
veto provisions. 
1. Determination of Congressional Intent- At first blush, it ap-
pears that Congress would have enacted Titles I-IX without Title X. 
The Act originated from two separate bodies of legislation. Titles I-IX 
arose from S. 1541 and H.R. 7130. Title X arose, through separate 
hearings and committees, from S. 373 and H.R. 8480. 140 The conference 
committee that drafted the Act's present language indicated the Act's 
IX, ch. V, 97 Stat. 1153, 1296 (1984). 
Chief Justice Burger, in Chadha, referred to an analogous, constitutional means to maintain 
congressional control over the suspension of deportation proceedings for persons situated as 
Chadha. INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2776 n.9 (1983). Chief Justice Burger wrote that 
§ 244(c)(2) "resembles" a report and wait provision when the legislative veto provision is eliminated. 
Id. Generally, a report and wait provision compels an administrative agency to report proposed 
regulation changes to the appropriate congressional committee. If the committee reports out a 
disapproval of the regulation change, the regulation's implementation is delayed to allow the 
entire Congress an opportunity to enact legislation preventing the proposed regulation. If no 
congressional action regarding the regulation is forthcoming within a specified period of time, 
the regulation becomes effective. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3535(0)(1)-(6) (Supp. II 1978) (report 
and wait provision for the Department of Housing and Urban Development). See generally Martin, 
The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 VA. L. REV. 253, 
257 n.9 (1982) (explanation of report and wait provisions along with other spurious "legislative 
vetos"). Unlike genuine report and wait provisions in which the statuts quo before the administrative 
agency's proposal persists for a specified period of time, the President's deferral of budget authority 
becomes effective immediately upon report. Therefore, § 1013 does not operate as a report and 
wait provision without § 1013(b). 
138. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
139. 2 U.S.C § 684(a) (1982). 
140. See generally A. ScmcK, supra note 104, at 51-81 (an excellent, concise account of the 
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dual sources when it specified distinct short titles for Titles I-IX and 
Title X. 141 Additionally, Congress has codified Title X separately from 
the remainder of the Act. 142 
The boundaries of statutory sections, however, do not determine 
severability. 143 Additionally, substantive evaluation of the Act's aims 
and legislative history reveals joint purposes and significant in-
terdependency among Titles I-IX and Title X. 
Congress viewed Titles I-IX and Title X as jointly necessary for com-
prehensive budget reform. 144 In 1972, Congress responded to Presi-
dent Nixon's criticisms of institutional and personal fiscal irrespon-
sibility within Congress 145 by establishing the Joint Study Committee 
on Budget Control. 146 President Nixon's unprecedented "policy im-
poundments" exacerbated the "Battle of the Budget" between the 
Democratic Congress and President Nixon. 147 Yet even President Nixon's 
staunchest congressional opponents realized (logically and politically) 
that Congress must reform its own budget process before. confronting 
President Nixon with regard to his impoundments. 148 
legislative history of the Act); H.R. 7130-REPORT, supra note 3, 16-26 {legislative history and 
background information concerning budget process and impoundment control reform in the House). 
141. Section l{a) states: "This Act may be cited as the 'Congressional Budget and lmpound-
ment Control Act of 1974'. Titles I through IX may be cited as the 'Congressional Budget Act 
of 1974' and Title X may be cited as the 'lmpoundment Control Act of 1974."' Pub. L. No. 
93-344, § l{a), 88 Stat. 296, 297 (1974). 
142. 2 U.S.C. §§ 681-688 (1982) {Chapter 17B-lmpoundment Control). 
143. The Supreme Court, contrarily, has suggested both that {I) an invalid provision within 
a statutory section is likely inseverable from the remainder of the section, Carter v. Carter Coal 
Co., 298 U.S. 238,314 (1936); and (2) that the boundaries of statutory sections do not determine 
a statute's severability. Berea College v. Kentucky, 21 I U.S. 45, 54-55 (1908); Leob v. Columbia 
Township Trustees, 179 U.S. 472, 489-90 (1900). The proposed severability model would follow 
the Supreme Court's implicit rejection of Carter in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108-09 (1976) 
(per curiam), and disregard artificial legislative divisions of statutory sections. Congressional in-
tent should guide all judicial determinations of statutes' severability. 
144. Representative Bolling, member of the House Committee on Rules (committee which 
reported on H.R. 7130) and ranking House majority member on the Conference Committee, 
summed Congress' sentiments when he said that "in my judgment [budget reform] is a waste 
of time" without impoundment restrictions. 119 CONG. REC. 39,723 (1973). See also 119 CoNG. 
REC. 25,556-57 (1973) (Remarks of Rep. Anderson); 120 CONG. REC. 7157 (1974) (Remarks of 
Sen. Nunn); 120 CONG. REc. 19,688 (1974) {Remarks of Rep. Broyhill); H.R. 7130-REPORT, 
supra note 3, at 16; Fisher, supra note 2, at 444. 
145. E.g., President's Special Message to the Congress on Federal Government Spending, 
Pua. PAPERS, 742 (July 26, 1972) ("hoary and traditional procedure of the Congress, which 
now permits action on the various spending programs as if they were unrelated and independent 
actions"); President's News Conference of January 31, 1973, 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 105, 
109-110 {Jan. 31, 1973) (institutional and personal fiscal irresponsibility justify impoundments). 
146. See generally A. SCHICK, supra note 104, at 39-41; J. PFIFFNER, supra note 3, at 122-24; 
see also H.R. 7130-REPORT, supra note 3, at 18-19. 
147. See generally J. PFIFFNER, supra note 3, at 3 ("[T]he 1974 Budget Act would not have 
been passed were it not for a threat perceived by the Congress that its constitutional spending 
power was being usurped by President Nixon."). 
For a discussion explaining why President Nixon's impoundments were distinct from his 
predescessors' impoundments, see Fisher, supra note 43, at 175-201. 
148. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 336, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 529, 531 (1973). 
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Congress realized the interdependency of budget process and im-
poundment reform legislation. 149 Congress feared that impoundment 
control legislation alone would not lessen President Nixon's ability to 
use Congress's fragmented budget process as justification for further 
impoundments. Congress also feared that budget process reform legisla-
tion alone would not sufficiently protect Congress's budgetary policies 
from an Executive's impoundments justified by claims of constitutional 
duty and economic efficiency. 150 Budget process reform without im-
poundment control was "a hopeless exercise" and a "waste of time" 
in the eyes of the 93d Congress. 1st Congressmen packaged impound-
ment control and budget process reform legislation together early in 
1973. 152 In November 1973, the House Committee on Rules reported 
that "[b]udget reform and impoundment control have a joint purpose: 
to restore responsibility for the spending policy of the United States 
to the legislative branch." 153 Additionally, congressional supporters and 
opponents of President Nixon opposed budget process reform and per-
manent impoundment reform enacted separately. 154 
149. E.g., 120 CONG. REc. 20,464-65 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Ervin); Fisher, supra note 2, 
at 413-14. 
150. H.R. 7130-REPORT, supra note 3, at 16. The Committee report reasoned: 
Budget reform and impoundment control have a joint purpose: to restore repon-
sibility for the spending policy of the United States to the legislative branch. One without 
the other would leave Congress in a weak and ineffective position. No matter how 
prudently Congress discharges its appropriations responsibility, legislative decisions have 
no meaning if they can be unilaterally abrogated by executive impoundments. On the 
other hand, if Congress appropriates funds without full awareness of the country's 
fiscal condition, its actions may be used by the President to justify the improper 
withholding of funds. By joining budget and impoundment control in a complete 
overhaul of the budget process, H.R. 7130 seeks to ensure that the power of appropria-
tion assigned to Congress by the Constitution is responsibly and effectively exercised. 
151. 120 CONG. REC. 7,658 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Muskie); 119 CONG. REC. 39,723 (1973) 
(remarks of Rep. Bolling). 
152. E.g., s. 905, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in STAFF OF THE SENATE SusCOMM. ON 
BUDGETING, MANAGEMENT, AND EXPENDITURES, 93D CONG., 1ST. SESS., IMPROVING CONGRESSIONAL 
CONTROL OVER THE BUDGET - A COMPENDIUM OF MATERIALS 85 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter 
cited as COMPENDIUM]; S. 1030, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in COMPENDIUM, supra, at 107. 
153. H.R. 7130-REPORT, supra note 3, at 16. The Senate's version of the Act restricted im-
poundments to the narrow managerial purposes that Congress originally envisioned in the An-
tideficiency Act. 120 CONG. REC. 7,658-59 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Muskie). See S. 1541, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The Senate apparently hoped that the Conference committee would resolve 
the impoundment reform impasse. Yet the Senate apparently was unwilling to enact budget reform 
without significant limitation upon the Executive's power to impound. See generally Schick, supra 
note 9, at 6-7 (tracing the Senate's various motives for approaching the Act's Conference Com-
mittee without a more conciliatory version of impoundment reform, such as S. 373, attached 
to S. 1541). 
154. E.g., 119 CONG. REc. 25,541, 25,556-57 (1973) Representatives Ford and Anderson per-
suaded the House that H.R. 8480, impoundment control, detached from budget-process reform 
was unwise. Consequently, the House of Representatives amended H.R. 8480 to limit its opera-
tion to one year with the expectation that permanent impoundment control would be incorporated 
into budget-process reform at a later date. H.R. 7130-Report, supra note 3, at 35; see also 
120 CONG. REC. 19,688 (1974) (REMARKS OF REP. BROYHILL); s. 373-REPORT, supra note 3, at 
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Finally, the impoundment impasse 155 between the two chambers 
threatened the enactment of the entire Congressional Budget and lm-
poundment Control Act. 156 Representative Bolling, ranking member 
of the House Conference Committee, informed the House that im-
poundment reform - not budget process reform - threatened to dead-
lock the Act's Conference Committee: "[T]he dilemma that confronted 
us [the Conference Committee] was a Senate position on impound-
ment which was virtually the exact opposite of the House position. 
We recognized that we must come to grips with that matter or we would 
probably lose the whole matter, both budget control and impound-
ment control.'' 157 
Although Titles I-IX and Title X exist separate in form, legislative 
history demonstrates their interdependence in purpose and enactment. 
Therefore, Title X should be inseverable from Titles I-IX. Courts, 
however, may find Title X severable from Titles I-IX due to the 
significance and comprehensive nature of the Congressional Budget and 
lmpoundment Control Act. Further support for Title X's severability 
from Titles I-IX exists because Titles I-IX clearly remain administratively 
and legally operative without Title X. 
2. Titles /-/X's Operation without Title X- The excision of Title 
X does not affect the administrative operations of Titles I-IX. Titles 
I-IX establish the congressional budget mechanims. 158 The presence of 
Title X may cause Congress and the President to approach budgetary 
conflicts differently. For example, the Executive may more readily ac-
cept a budget item if he believes the possibility for deferral exists at 
a later date, 1 59 especially if Congress must enact legislation to defeat 
a deferral of budget authority. No formal procedural link, however, 
exists between the budget process (Titles I-IX) and the resolution of 
impoundment controversy (Title X). Titles I-IX, therefore, would re-
main administratively operative despite Title X's absence. Likewise, 
Title X's absence would have no effect upon the legal operation of 
Titles I-IX. Titles I-IX impose legal obligations upon the Executive 
branch and Congress and establish enforcement procedures independent-
ly of Title X. 
Titles I-IX remain legally and administratively operative without Title 
X. Nonetheless, the Act's legislative history reveals that: (1) Titles I-
33 (minority views of Sens. Saxbe, Roth, Gurney, and Brock); id. at 36 (remarks of Sen. Percy); 
Fisher, supra at note 2, at 444. 
155. See supra text accompanying notes I 19-24. 
156. 120 CONG. REC. 19,674 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Bolling); see also A. ScmcK, supra 
note 104, at 70. 
157. 120 CONG. REC. 19,674 (1974). 
158. Pub. L. No. 93-344 § l(a)-(b), 88 Stat. 296, 297-98 (1974) (short titles and Table of 
Contents). 
159. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 450-54. 
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IX ensure executive compliance with Title X by removing economic 
austerity and congressional fiscal irresponsibility as justifications for 
impoundments; and (2) Title X protects the integrity of Titles I-IX's 
budget process by safeguarding Congress's budgetary choices. Con-
gress passed the Act during an era of congressional resurgence. 16° Con-
gress did not seek partial budgetary reform. 161 Congress enacted and 
heralded the Act as comprehensive budget reform that reasserted Con-
gress as the final arbiter over the federal purse. 162 The Act's titles are 
mutually dependent. It appears, therefore, that Congress would not 
have enacted Titles I-IX without Title X. Consequently, Title X should 
be inseverable from Titles I-IX. 163 
CONCLUSION 
Section 1013(b) is a legislative veto provision. Although the legislative 
veto provison invalidated in Chadha arguably poses a greater threat 
to the underlying philosophy of article I than section 1013(b), the 
Supreme Court's invalidation of the legislative veto provision in Chadha 
logically extends to require invalidation of section 1013(b). Legislative 
history indicates that Congress neither would have enacted Title X 
without section 1013(b) nor Titles I-IX without Title X. Section 1013(b) 
was the essential part of the congressional compromise that allowed 
the enactment of Title X and, consequently, the enactment of the Con-
gressional Budget a_nd Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Therefore, 
Title X and section 1013(b), and Titles I-IX and Title X, are respec-
tively inseverable. Consequently, the unconstitutionality of section 
1013(b) requires the invalidation of the entire Congressional Budget 
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. 
-Steven W. Pelak 
160. See generally, 1. SUNDQUIST, supra note 114, at 1-3. 
161. President Nixon's comments in his memoirs reveal that the second session of the 93d 
Congress was not a period of "partial" reform or action: "In the second term, I had thrown 
down a gauntlet to Congress ... and challenged them to an epic battle. We had already skirmished 
over the limitations of prerogative and power represented in ... the impoundment of funds, 
and the battle of the budget." R. NIXON, RN: TttE MEMOIRS OF RIClIARD NIXON 850 (1978). 
162. E.g., H.R. 7130-REPORT, supra note 3, at 16-18; Abascal & Kramer, supra note 47, at 168. 
163. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58. 
